Tuesday, March 14, 2006

The post-neo con strategy?

Political discussion is filling these days with conservatives who have seen the light that neo-con idealism was a very bad idea - repenting of it, and returning to the timeless truths of stability-oriented realism. Who? William F. Buckley, Francis Fukuyama, among others. John Podhoretz, in the New York Post, discusses this in the context of Rich Lowry's new National Review essay on the new "to-hell-with-them" hawks. Here.

As Podhoretz frames Lowry's argument:

CAN the War on Terror be won? America's inability to secure a victory in Iraq against the insurgency suggests to many people of good will and good sense that it really can't be. They believe the enemies of the United States are motivated by a force more powerful than we reckoned - by a religious ideology that has seduced hundreds of millions of people who prefer its stark certainties to the ambiguities and confusions of Western bourgeois life.

We can't beat it, they say, and we can't join it. So what is left for us? Just to say "the hell with them."


Richard Lowry's very important piece in the new issue of National Review is about the "to-hell-with-them hawks." They are, in Lowry's words, "conservatives who are comfortable using force abroad, but have little patience for a deep entanglement with the Muslim world, which they consider unredeemable, or at least not worth the strenuous effort of trying to redeem."


They look at Iraq's decimated civic culture and they wonder at the naiveté of a president who believed he could bring Western-style liberty to the place. They look at the Muslim world and they see Hamas elected by Palestinians and months of rioting over supposedly offensive cartoons by people who are happy to celebrate suicide bombers.

President Bush's prescription for ultimate victory in the War on Terror was bringing freedom to those who are not free, because the longing for freedom resides in every human heart. Ludicrous sentimentality, say the to-hell-with-them hawks. Muslims don't want it and they don't deserve it and we shouldn't be trying to give it to them.


Lowry's answer is this: "Confident predictions about which cultures are or are not capable of democracy have the aspect of unassailable truth - right up to the point that they don't. Representative Arab government will be impossible until it happens."

The project in Iraq is an effort to change the terms of the discussion in the Arab Muslim world. Lowry has come up with an elegant and original way of putting the visionary aspect of the Bush freedom doctrine in real-world terms: "The contemporary Middle East has featured a competition of radicalisms - who can be religiously purer, and more hostile to the West? The project in Iraq is an attempt to shift the terms of the competition to who can better deliver peace, prosperity and representation."

The to-hell-with-them hawks - among them Lowry's own mentor, William F. Buckley - have found a middle ground between the merely partisan opposition arguments of the Democrats and the poisonous attitudes of the far-right isolationists.


Their argument seems hard-headed and unsentimental. People are trying to murder Americans, and such people ought to die. Kill as many of the bad guys as you can abroad. Strike Iran from the air if you have to. Do whatever you must to secure the homeland. Don't let Arabs run the ports. Racially profile Muslims and Arabs out the wazoo. No crocodile tears for the excesses at Gitmo and Abu Ghraib.


What's missing here is what has been missing from the most hard-headed discussions of Iraq since the end of the 2004 election, and that is an understanding of just why President Bush formulated the freedom doctrine.


The problem is that the policies advocated by the "hell hawks" and by defeatist Democrats offer no real possibility of an end to the war against Islamic radicalism. It will go on forever.

And if it does, it seems certain that at some point in the next few decades, millions
of people are going to die in a successful terrorist assault using weapons of mass destruction.

I admit to a certain sympathy to the to-hell-with-them hawks. The bet made by the Bush administration was never merely one of Wilsonian idealism. It was always one that said - thus winning the endorsement of hard-headed realists about war such as Victor Davis Hanson - that the old realist strategy of stability was a key element in what had produced a successful strike against the United States, and the likelihood, over enough time, of successful and catastrophic strikes to come. But the problem could not be resolved by more application of the same old realist doctrine. Realism had to accept that idealism about political systems and the terms of rule in the Middle East, in particular, had to be changed radically. It was always something which was a roll of the dice. It was a strategy designed to introduce sharp and quite possibly revolutionary and reactionary (ie, Islamist) changes on the region. But the status quo was killing us, and had to change. Idealism was, in fact, the new realism.

The problem with this, of course, is that democracy - as all Burkeans understand - is a culturally very specific phenomenon, one that builds on slowly accreted institutions and cultural dispositions. Freedom may be a yearning for people everywhere, but democracy is not, and even if it is, the conditions under which it thrives are delicate, even in existing democracies such as our own, not robust. In any case, as my very intelligent Egyptian graduate student points out in his writing, the blunt fact - and he should know, having been a prosecuting judge in Egypt prosecuting Muslim Brotherhood terrorists - is that, with the varieties of Western promises, whether socialism or capitalism or anything seemingly having failed the Middle Eastern masses, they are determined to give Islam a shot. Democracy will ratify that. It might deratify it, if the system remains democratic long enough to evolve, or it might be one vote, one time.

One of the peculiar shifts in the political discourse of the United States is to watch how idealists in foreign policy, on the left - those who endlessly preached the virtues of idealist, human rights promoting, values laden, even if destabilizing policy by the United States - have so thorougly shifted ground to become the new realists. It was a mistake to take out Saddam. He could have been contained (and, presumably, his even crazier sons, too, but we'll charitably leave that). It is quite remarkable to hear that line from the left that used to pony up to demands for policies that would have been quite as destabilizing. And then conservatives, who had long preached stability as its own value - preaching, however, not precisely Burkean stability within a society, stability of the social order, as a value whether or not the society is democratic or deeply respectful of human rights, but instead preaching the stability of the international political order at any price in values, which is not quite the same thing - suddenly got behind regime change for idealist reasons.

Most of us, when thinking sensibly and not partisanly, want both those things. We recognize that political and social stability is an important thing, foundational to other virtues in society. We recognize the value of stability even in situations that are, in profound ways, otherwise unjust. The reason is that the instability that is the alternative is that which we associate with failed states, the Thirty Years War, the war of all against all - more exactly, every man for himself and God against all. There is a wonderful passage in the middle of that great, now somewhat neglected novel by George Konrad, The Loser, in which, in the midst of the first days of the 1956 revolution in Hungary, the narrator is simply trying to get together enough troops and police to restore order so that some negotiations can take place without many, many people getting killed.

It wasn't that he thought the existing order was just. It was, instead, that he had had enough of revolution and war to know what the alternative would be, massacres and piles of corpses. Of course, we also want democracy, justice, and human rights, too. It would be nice if there were never any tradeoffs. It would be nice if there were, as the Catholic theologians put it, a unity of the virtues. But it seems far more likely that we live in the world Isaiah Berlin described - plural and sometimes incommensurate and sometimes incompatible social goods.

Well, George Bush, with my blessing then and my continued blessing now, rolled the dice that you can't really have one without at least a measure of the other. As the human rights activists liked to say, before they decided to become hard-hearted realists, no justice, no peace. If you don't change the fundamental social terms of the Middle East, there is no possibility of winning the war on terror. There are immense contradictions in this, of course - the House of Saud would have to fall, which for oil reasons cannot be high on the Bush administration list. I expected that liberal human rights types would criticize the administration primarily for its failures to execute its own idealism - the idealism of the Bush second inaugural. But that wasn't what they said - instead they took on his idealism, and abandoned their own (not for good - just so long as it is associated with - horrors - a Republican).

But now you have conservatives who are questioning the idealism-is-the-new-realism strategy. Their grounds are simply that the idealism cannot be achieved, and if it is, it will be only to deliver a bunch of Islamist regimes. Some of us think that would be, on balance, historically better than the current situation, of faux-modernity carrying the full weight of authoritarianism by vicious Middle Eastern satrapies. At least it has moral and realist clarity about who our enemies are. The question, however, is what the newly repentant conservative realists think the new strategy should be. The answer, as Podhoretz and Lowry observe, is essentially to abandon the forward strategy, the offensive strategy.

It will not, I sincerely hope, have escaped notice in the Pentagon and the Office of Policy Planning in the State Department that if, as the re-realist conservatives claim, Americans do not have the patience to build reasonably stable, reasonably democratic societies, we will need a new strategic doctrine. The only one that I can see is a defensive one - one that attempts to draw the lines at the borders, at the airports, at the ports, in the screening of people, while leaving it to others to determine what goes on beyond our borders. We may make raids and forays out into the world to deal with threats, but our offensive strategy will be a raiding strategy, not one of persistence. It may seek to attack particular targets within places that provide safe havens for transnational terrorists - it may seek to attack the terrorists.

What it will not do is what Bush essentially undertook after 9/11 - to take down regimes that harbored terrorists or else presented unacceptable risks of arming terrorists with weapons of mass destruction. What made the Bush approach "war" instead of merely the Clinton's administration's desultory policy was not the willingness to attack terrorists - even the Clinton administration was occasionally willing to do that. It was the willingness to bring down regimes that provided the havens for terrorists, and finally, in rolling the dice on change in the Middle East, to seek to change the social equation, and not merely the political one, on which all terrorism, finally, rests. That is what the returning realists seek to give up. No doubt war is a poor method of social engineering. But certainly, in my view, the old strategy of unjust stability merely served as the harbinger of more devastating attacks that ran an unacceptable risk of successful catastrophic terrorism using WMD. It could not go on. A defensive strategy, especially one drawn at the borders of the United States, or still worse, one that relies on the "international community" and multilateralism or liberal internationalism - this is the most vacuous and unconvincing part of Fukuyama's argument in his new book - will not keep America safe, not in a struggle with an enemy on the historical offensive. The roll of the dice was - and is - the right move.

Donald Horowitz on ethnic conflict in Iraq

(Update, December 7, 2006. I've also posted excerpts from Professor Horowitz's December 4, 2006 WSJ piece here.)

Donald Horowitz, a professor of law and political science at Duke University, has a very astute discussion of ethnic conflict in Iraq in the Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, March 14, 2006. Here. Don is one of the smartest people I think I have ever met, and his Ethnic Groups in Conflict remains a standard of the field after something like twenty years. He is one of the rare commentators on the Iraq war who is able to maintain a cool, analytic, measured tone - neither downplaying risks and bad news nor celebrating them, either. Excerpts:

***
Dangerous Stalemate in Iraq

By DONALD L. HOROWITZ
Wall Street Journal
March 14, 2006; Page A18

There are two crises in Iraq. One is the obvious crisis of sectarian violence, the other the less obvious one of government formation. The two are related. The elections in December produced a more or less predictable result -- four major blocs of seats. Shiite parties in the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) received 128 seats out of 275, short of a majority to form a government. The principal Kurdish list came in second with 53; the main Sunni parties gained 44 and the intersectarian list of Ayad Allawi won only 25. Together the Shiite UIA and the Kurds would easily have a secure majority; and if they accommodated Sunni demands for constitutional changes, Sunni parties could join a government that spanned the major cleavages and undercut the insurgency.

Something peculiar happened on the way to such a happy outcome. The Shiites and Kurds, who had so completely dominated politics and constitution-making in post-invasion Iraq, fell out. By an intraparty majority of one vote, the Shiites chose as their candidate for prime minister the sitting occupant of that office, Ibrahim al-Jaafari -- the one man Kurdish president Jalal Talabani could not abide. For their part, the Kurds, who had profited handsomely from their close relationship with the Shiites, turned their back on that relationship and demanded a national unity government, including not only the Sunnis but Mr. Allawi's secular party, too. Moreover, they demanded that the interior and defense ministries, implicated in sectarian violence, be assigned to neutral figures and that a new "national security council" be created to check in some unspecified way the formal institutions created by the constitution. The Kurds and all their allies have 136 seats, short of a majority, just as the Shiites are. And so there is stalemate.

That stalemate feeds the insurgency, not only by freeing up politically affiliated militias to attack their sectarian enemies, but by creating an interregnum whose uncertainty is an ideal environment for intergroup violence. Reciprocally, the violence creates bitterness that makes it harder for political leaders to span the chasm that divides them. For the moment, even the deep disenchantment of Sunni leaders with the constitution has been shelved as the raw struggle over who will control Iraq takes center stage.

Why the Kurds defected from an alliance that had served them so well is a mystery. After all, the constitution they crafted with the Shiites suits their interest in going their own way with a Kurdish region in the north. What is very clear is that the alignment of nearly all Shiites on one side and nearly everyone else on the other is exceedingly unhealthy. The Shiites are a majority in a country long deprived of majoritarian institutions. Majorities want majority rule; a majority that sees itself as cheated of its rightful place in government is a dangerous organism.
Consider a single, obscure but important instance: the Punjab election of 1946 in British India. The Punjab was then divided among a Muslim majority, a Hindu minority and a Sikh minority. The Muslim League was overwhelmingly favored by Muslims but fell just short of a majority. A small Muslim splinter party joined Hindu and Sikh politicians, enabling them to form a government and cheating the vast majority of Muslims out of a government they saw as rightfully theirs. The result: horrendous violence that opened the door to the partition of India, with a death toll in the hundreds of thousands. There are examples of the phenomenon in other countries where majorities are shut out.

The same could easily happen in Iraq if an anti-UIA alignment secures enough seats to form a government. Some think a civil war is already under way, but an inclusive government stands at least some chance of averting the worst. It will not be easy to negotiate such a government. A coalition would be easier to form if the UIA abandoned its insistence on Mr. Jaafari as its prime ministerial choice and thought seriously about the negative effects of biased interior and defense ministries. Many informed Iraqis think Mr. Jaafari has been ineffective.

The UIA could also rethink its insistence on a less-than-fully inclusive government. It is true that ministerial positions and other perquisites of governing normally go to the best electoral performers. But these are not normal times in which a winner-take-all mentality should prevail: It is imperative that everyone who can dampen the violence find a place in government. That will also mean Shiite compromises on the constitution so disliked by Sunni, even if those negotiations take place over a more extended period than the four months contemplated for amendments to the current constitutional deal.

On the Kurdish-Sunni-secular side, it needs to be recognized that denying the Shiites plurality of a first-among-equals position in government is a very bad idea. It is not only of dubious democratic legitimacy: More importantly, an anti-UIA coalition risks explosive violence that will put Iraq on the road to disaster -- to years of strife, or secession and territorial partition, or even to internationalized Sunni-Shiite warfare that can embroil the whole region. Responsible people on both sides of this new divide have to step back from their maximum demands, lest pursuing them place every party and group in dire jeopardy. Likewise, if the U.S. entertains any notion that supporting an anti-UIA coalition provides a convenient way to exclude Iranian influence from Iraq, attractive though that notion may be, the costs of indulging such an idea will be far too high to contemplate.

* * *
Finally, thought should be given to the proportional representation (PR) electoral system that, in combination with the Kurdish defection, produced the impasse. List-system PR is the preferred electoral system of many international advisers helping in the creation of transitional institutions. In Iraq's first elections, it might have been hard, though not impossible, to choose another system; and other systems might also have produced inconclusive results in the recent elections. But some systems would have offered a chance of a more definitive electoral outcome, and might have been preferred. A protracted interregnum in which armed gangs go about their gory business while statesmanship is in hiding should not be anyone's idea of a reasonable transition to democracy.

Mr. Horowitz, professor of law and political science at Duke, is author of "The Deadly Ethnic Riot" (University of California, 2001).

Monday, March 13, 2006

Slavoj Zizek on Defenders of Faith, and of Susan Moller Okin and the surrender of feminism to political Islam


The humanist philosopher Slavoj Zizek (pictured) had a very good opinion piece in the New York Times yesterday arguing - quite correctly in my estimation - that Europe's Muslims should be grateful for Europe's atheists. Here at the NYT.

(Zizek once sharply objected to something I wrote, in an essay called "How Much Democracy Is Too Much?" which was widely circulated, including here - he was objecting to my essay in the New York Times Magazine from 2003, "Who Owns the Rules of War?" which can be found on SSRN, here.)

This is a good essay. But I have two difficulties with it. The first is that he, in classically European fashion, produces an elegant characterization of the issue, but then adamantly refuses to address the dangling question. What happens when Muslims in Europe are not in the least grateful to Europe's atheists, despite Zizek's telling them they should be and moreover telling them so on the pages of the New York Times opinion pages (and this, in the Sunday edition, too!) and instead simply take strategic advantage of the rather magnanimous social space that liberalism affords even to those who are and those who might well become, if remaining unassimilated, enemies of Europe's traditional liberal values even as they deploy them to their own ends? What happens if the appetite grows with the eating? What then, Zizek?

My second difficulty with Zizek's position is that when he says Europe's atheists, he really means those who actively created the atheist position (and I would include agnostic as well as anti-clerical) in the glorious period of the anti-clerical past, saw it as essentially a form of religious belief. He does not mean what Europe mostly means today - a post Christian society that is neither religious nor actively anti-religious nor actively humanist nor much of anything else. Mostly just passive and exhausted. Just keep paying my welfare and retirement and health care and vacations to southern Spain until I die. But little active interest in the kind of society that one leaves behind, whether Christian or Muslim or liberal humanist or much of anything else.

It is unsurprising that Zizek has to reach to his home town newspaper in Ljublana, Mladina, to find an example of an uncompromising, genuinely liberal newspaper that would defend a la Voltaire the right to build a mosque but also insist on publishing the Mohammed cartoons. (Mladina is a terrific newspaper - I have followed it from the time I first began visiting Slovenia in the 1980s on behalf of Human Rights Watch before the Yugoslav crackup, and continue to follow it from a distance in my work for the Media Development Loan Fund, a nonprofit venture fund that supports independent media.)

The reason Zizek has to reach so far is that by and large the newspapers, like the cultures and governments, of Western Europe, have shifted away from liberalism to multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is the attempt not to allow the free flow of ideas, but instead to manage from the top down, the acceptable range of opinion, in the interests of not giving offense to any empowered identities. Of course, it runs into grave difficulties when the ever more exquisitely offendable sensibilities of its constituent identity groups conflict - Muslims and feminists, for example - but in Western Europe, at least, the resolution of that has been a classic power move. Muslims are seen, correctly, as an indentity constituency more threatening to the social peace than feminists, who seem laughably quaint by comparison.

So power - in this case, riots and threats of riots, violence and threats of violence - wins in the attempt of multiculturalism politically to manage intergroup identity conflict. Too late will Western Europe - and quite possibly the United States - discover that liberal values, in which free expression really is free expression, and violence over expression is flatly unacceptable, and sensibilities and sensitivities simply have to adapt to a rude and crude public sphere, do a better job of accommodating identity than top down managerial multiculturalism. Too late, too late to rediscover Voltaire.

(It is, for example, more than strange to reach back a bare six or seven years to Susan Moller Okin's liberal feminist essays - to see how uncompromising they are with respect to multiculturalism and religion - so uncompromising as to make me question how 'liberal' they really are - but also how utterly antiquated. Peter Berkowitz, in a 1999 review of a major essay by Okin with responses by various intellectuals, summarizes her basic point very well:

"Okin's core argument is simple: The subjugation of women, by men or by cultures, is wrong. Liberal democracies should protect the individual rights of all women within their borders, including women whose cultures and religions sanction practices that deny women's fundamental rights. Liberal democracies should not grant minorities special group rights or privileges to assist them in preserving their culture or religion in a foreign land, as many theorists of multiculturalism wish. For individual rights are sacrosanct in a liberal democracy, oppression in all its forms is bad, and, Okin suggests, a culture or religion that deprives women of human dignity is not worthy of preservation. Compelling as this argument may be when stated in the abstract, it prompts serious questions when applied to concrete matters of law and public policy. Where does subjugation leave off and a respectable way of life different from that cherished by liberals and feminists begin? Are all forms of subjugation and oppression properly the object of state action, or do some lie beyond the ken of government in a liberal democracy? What policies and laws provide the best means of enforcing individual rights? Which individual rights are fundamental and nonnegotiable? Yet these vexing questions do not vex Okin. She categorically condemns as sexist and illiberal clitoridectomy, polygamy, arranged marriages of teenage girls, and also veiling (the practice whereby Muslim women cover their faces in public). None of these practices should be tolerated by liberal democracies, she argues, even if prohibiting them requires state intervention in religious life."

That said, in 1999, where today are the feminists who will even take on the Taliban's principal spokesman, now enrolled unrepentantly at Yale? Multiculturalism, I would say, has won the argument with feminism hands down. Feminism licks its wounds by kicking against the pricks of Catholicism. But it has surrendered ignominiously in the face of political Islam and, indeed, given the uncompromising nature of Okin's arguments (which I think, in agreement with Peter Berkowitz in his review, are indeed overly strong, indeed illiberal - but then I'm not a feminist) in the face of any version of Islam whatsoever.)

(I say, read Max Frisch's 1950s play, Biedermann und die Brandstifter.).

Excerpts from Zizek:
***
March 12, 2006
New York Times
Op-Ed Contributor

Defenders of the Faith

By SLAVOJ ZIZEK
London

FOR centuries, we have been told that without religion we are no more than egotistic animals fighting for our share, our only morality that of a pack of wolves; only religion, it is said, can elevate us to a higher spiritual level. Today, when religion is emerging as the wellspring of murderous violence around the world, assurances that Christian or Muslim or Hindu fundamentalists are only abusing and perverting the noble spiritual messages of their creeds ring increasingly hollow. What about restoring the dignity of atheism, one of Europe's greatest legacies and perhaps our only chance for peace?

More than a century ago, in "The Brothers Karamazov" and other works, Dostoyevsky warned against the dangers of godless moral nihilism, arguing in essence that if God doesn't exist, then everything is permitted. The French philosopher André Glucksmann even applied Dostoyevsky's critique of godless nihilism to 9/11, as the title of his book, "Dostoyevsky in Manhattan," suggests.

This argument couldn't have been more wrong: the lesson of today's terrorism is that if God exists, then everything, including blowing up thousands of innocent bystanders, is permitted — at least to those who claim to act directly on behalf of God, since, clearly, a direct link to God justifies the violation of any merely human constraints and considerations. In short, fundamentalists have become no different than the "godless" Stalinist Communists, to whom everything was permitted since they perceived themselves as direct instruments of their divinity, the Historical Necessity of Progress Toward Communism.

During the Seventh Crusade, led by St. Louis, Yves le Breton reported how he once encountered an old woman who wandered down the street with a dish full of fire in her right hand and a bowl full of water in her left hand. Asked why she carried the two bowls, she answered that with the fire she would burn up Paradise until nothing remained of it, and with the water she would put out the fires of Hell until nothing remained of them: "Because I want no one to do good in order to receive the reward of Paradise, or from fear of Hell; but solely out of love for God." Today, this properly Christian ethical stance survives mostly in atheism.

Fundamentalists do what they perceive as good deeds in order to fulfill God's will and to earn salvation; atheists do them simply because it is the right thing to do. Is this also not our most elementary experience of morality? When I do a good deed, I do so not with an eye toward gaining God's favor; I do it because if I did not, I could not look at myself in the mirror. A moral deed is by definition its own reward. David Hume, a believer, made this point in a very poignant way, when he wrote that the only way to show true respect for God is to act morally while ignoring God's existence.

Two years ago, Europeans were debating whether the preamble of the European Constitution should mention Christianity as a key component of the European legacy. As usual, a compromise was worked out, a reference in general terms to the "religious inheritance" of Europe. But where was modern Europe's most precious legacy, that of atheism? What makes modern Europe unique is that it is the first and only civilization in which atheism is a fully legitimate option, not an obstacle to any public post.

Atheism is a European legacy worth fighting for, not least because it creates a safe public space for believers. Consider the debate that raged in Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia, my home country, as the constitutional controversy simmered: should Muslims (mostly immigrant workers from the old Yugoslav republics) be allowed to build a mosque? While conservatives opposed the mosque for cultural, political and even architectural reasons, the liberal weekly journal Mladina was consistently outspoken in its support for the mosque, in keeping with its concern for the rights of those from other former Yugoslav republics.

Not surprisingly, given its liberal attitudes, Mladina was also one of the few Slovenian publications to reprint the infamous caricatures of Muhammad. And, conversely, those who displayed the greatest "understanding" for the violent Muslim protests those cartoons caused were also the ones who regularly expressed their concern for the fate of Christianity in Europe.
These weird alliances confront Europe's Muslims with a difficult choice: the only political force that does not reduce them to second-class citizens and allows them the space to express their religious identity are the "godless" atheist liberals, while those closest to their religious social practice, their Christian mirror-image, are their greatest political enemies. The paradox is that Muslims' only real allies are not those who first published the caricatures for shock value, but those who, in support of the ideal of freedom of expression, reprinted them.

While a true atheist has no need to boost his own stance by provoking believers with blasphemy, he also refuses to reduce the problem of the Muhammad caricatures to one of respect for other's beliefs. Respect for other's beliefs as the highest value can mean only one of two things: either we treat the other in a patronizing way and avoid hurting him in order not to ruin his illusions, or we adopt the relativist stance of multiple "regimes of truth," disqualifying as violent imposition any clear insistence on truth.

What, however, about submitting Islam — together with all other religions — to a respectful, but for that reason no less ruthless, critical analysis? This, and only this, is the way to show a true respect for Muslims: to treat them as serious adults responsible for their beliefs.

Slavoj Zizek, the international director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, is the author, most recently, of "The Parallax View."

What Saddam was thinking ... the French & Russians will protect me with their SC vetoes

Read Daniel Drezner's post summarizing reports newly made public on what Saddam was thinking in the run-up to the war and even during the fighting ... at the center of his thinking was a two-step calculation: First, that the US and Britain would not act without express Security Council permission and, two, that he had in effect rented the Security Council votes of France and Russia through, in particular, the oil for food scheme. In addition, he feared insurrection by his own forces more than he feared the US. The underlying articles he links are fascinating reading.

We are watching the rise of a new (? maybe not so new?) phenomenon in the Security Council, of members renting out the veto, not for political gain in the direct sense, but directly for economic gain, for commercial gain. France and Russia acted partly from political interest, but partly from economic and commercial interest as well. China, today, acts from essentially commercial interest in renting out its veto to Sudan in exchange for oil concessions.

Sunday, March 12, 2006

Don Sparks, in memoriam


The previous post, as it veered off into discussing the relationship of classical and folk music, caused me to want to post something related, although sadly so.

I learned last week, entirely by accident, that my old friend from my folk dancing days in high school, Don Sparks, passed away in December 2005, not very long ago, at the age of 47. Don was a gifted musician and dancer who started dancing at about the age of 13 or 14 and made his career with Aman folk ensemble in Los Angeles. Don and I had wonderful times as teens dancing together - I never had his talent as a musician, but I do remember when he made his own Serbian bagpipe one summer, after slaughtering, gutting, and skinning a goat on his grandparents' Texas ranch. We also spent other times together - a day spent climbing Mt. Cucamonga above my home town of Claremont, California, near Mt. Baldy - we came down sunburned beyond belief. I was an usher at his first wedding, and even though we lost touch entirely many years ago, when I moved East, I always thought the world of Don. It was a lost world of teenagers hanging out at a Greek coffee/dance house in Los Angeles called the Intersection - in retrospect, I see how lucky I was to have found a social scene like that, sexy and sensual on the one hand - ethnic dance is often unapologetically about courtship, of course - and very group oriented with a group of brainy older graduate students from UCLA and Cal Tech but also families who treated the coffee house as an extension of the old country - it was sexy for a teen without being raunchy. There were good people there who were very good for a nerdy, awkward teen like me. I randomly googled Don a week ago, and discovered to my sorrow that he had passed away. My condolences to his many friends and family.

The Shanghai Quartet and ChinaSong


The Shanghai Quartet played at the Washington Conservatory of Music, where my daughter takes cello, last Saturday, and my wife and I went to hear it. Fabulous concert - Haydn, Dvorak, and a medley of folksongs from China. There is a reason why the NYT says that there is no more polished string quartet playing today.

The Haydn and Dvorak were terrific, but I was especially intrigued with the folksongs. I spoke with the group's violist, who was the composer/arranger, Yi-Wen Jiang, at a reception after the recital. He described how he came to know these songs, as a youth sent to the countryside for "reeducation" during the Cultural Revolution. It was prohibited to play or sing anything from the West - no Mozart, Bach, Beethoven. Everything had to be Chinese and peasant. So he learned these folks songs because he wasn't allowed anything else, and has now arranged them for string quartet. As quartet music, it is striking - it has a certain background element of Broadway showtunes, of 1930s and 40s movie music about it. I was struck with that thought listening to it in concert, and I asked him about that element, wondering if I was just reading it in - but he smiled broadly and said that he wanted something in the music that brought back a certain feeling of "old China," "old Shanghai," as he imagined it must have been for a European before the Second World War. It is deceptively simple folk music, but overlaid very subtly with elements of different times and cultures, and very subtly different cultural points of view. In that sense, it undoes the revolutionary purity of the Cultural Revolution altogether - and becomes a shining example of the "new cosmopolitanism," the cosmopolitanism of mixing and contamination that Kwame Anthony Appiah celebrates in his new book.

My sense of Western classical music is that it is people like Li, Bright Sheng, and others who are able to draw upon cultural traditions such as China, Korea, other places who will keep it vigorous. The academic movements of the past sixty or eighty years are a dead end. I know, I know, what a philistine I am, not to appreciate avant garde and cutting edge music, and sure, I know all about how melody is dead, and all that (although the revival of all the supposedly dead stuff is actually well underway). I also have ambivalent feelings about the classical music move to domesticate folk traditions and make them comprehensible to the Western classical tradition itself. I don't precisely prefer the flamenco music I heard in Sevilla to the Parisianized and Romanticized versions of the music of Spain that Albeniz and Falla took to France; I like both versions, but they are different things. I don't precisely prefer csardas and all that stuff in the raw music of the Gypsy originals, on those old Folkways albums, to the classicized version made acceptable for the concert hall. But I have felt the difference, ever since a high school girl friend who was heavily into the folk dance scene in the 1970s in LA, and pulled me into as well.

The reality, of course, is that they are two different genres, and both are good in their own ways. Best not to mix them, though, to judge by a concert a couple of years ago as part of the Silk Road Project, I believe but don't quote me, that counterposed folk Gyspy versions and classical versions; from the reviews, they didn't seem to mix, and for an obvious reason. The Gypsy music was for dancing - it didn't sound right in a concert hall as classical listening music. You needed to dance to it to appreciate it. A very astute cello teacher once told me more or less the same thing about learning the differences between Baroque dance forms in trying (with indifferent results, I'm afraid) to play that chamber music - she said, you know, if you don't understand the nature of the actual dances, how they are performed, you can't really understand the subtle differences in emphasis. She was right - without knowing something about the dances themselves, it all seemed like there were two kinds - ones in 4/4 and ones in 3/4. Whereas it is vastly more complicated than that.

(One of the most fun reviews I ever wrote was on amateur music, for the TLS, here.)

The CIA christmas ornament

On Friday, I finished the second of two sessions at StratGroup, a sort of CIA in-house think tank. It holds non-classified, open source seminars with academics and different experts on different kinds of possible future events and trends. I was involved with one on the future of transnational advocacy networks - networks of NGOs. A terrific small group of academics, from political science, network theory, and so on, trying to suggest where transnational network advocacy might go over the next twenty five years, and what factors might affect that. My thanks to all the people who participated - I certainly had my thinking stimulated.

But I must add that the CIA headquarters has the finest gift shop of any US government agency I've ever been in, including the Pentagon. Amazing for a building that is not open to the public for tours - you could buy not just sweatshirts and caps, but Waterford crystal with the CIA logo. And anything related to golf. So for my wife, who collects Christmas ornaments but who never reads this blog, I got a CIA Christmas ornament, which I'll give her when we put up the Christmas tree this year. And a hot pink CIA cap and bag for my kid.

Apropos of something Instapundit linked about undercover security, the sign at the checkout register said: "If you are undercover, do not use your credit card to pay for purchases!"

Jack Goldsmith & Tim Wu book on internet control now out

I have just started reading it. Check it out here. This is not my area, but I know Jack well from other areas of international law, and he is one of the brightest people around. Furthermore - although it will surprise no one that very bright academics sometimes tend to arrogance, Jack Goldsmith is one of the nicest people I know - Harvard is very lucky to have him.

Dr. Wafa Sultan in the NYT

This is one very brave woman. NYT profile of Dr. Wafa Sultan, here.

Slobo dead, and good riddance

Well, Slobodan Milosevic is dead - died in his bed, even if it was in a jail cell in the Hague. I can't say that I think the whole trial proceeding - the sheer length of it, the fact that Milosevic managed to make a monkey of the court, succeded in getting himself elected to parliament in Serbia from his cell, and generally garnered sympathy for his genocidal self in Serbia, while in the end running out the clock on justice - speaks well for the Yugoslavia tribunal or for international tribunals in general. What are we running on costs for the Arusha tribunal - $20 million or so per trial? See this post by Julian Ku at Opinio Juris summarizing an important piece on this costs question in Foreign Policy.

The Economist takes a different view this week, here, in a special sub only report. But then it's difficult to take the Economist too seriously on its reporting without knowing who actually wrote the report. On the three or four occasions where I've been consulted by someone writing an Economist special report, the journalist in question had sharply formulated editorial views on what the result of the "investigation" was supposed to be, and on one occasion was actually a player in the process temporarily playing journalist.

Mark Steyn on Taheri-azar

Mark Steyn in the Chicago Sun-Times, here:

***

Media shockingly ignorant of Muslims among us

March 12, 2006
Chicago Sun-Times

BY MARK STEYN SUN-TIMES COLUMNIST

This week's Voldemort Award goes to the New York Times for their account of a curious case of road rage in North Carolina:

"The man charged with nine counts of attempted murder for driving a Jeep through a crowd at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill last Friday told the police that he deliberately rented a four-wheel-drive vehicle so he could 'run over things and keep going.' "

The driver in question was Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar.

Whoa, don't jump to conclusions. The Times certainly didn't. As the report continued:

"According to statements taken by the police, Mr. Taheri-azar, 22, an Iranian-born graduate of the university, felt that the United States government had been 'killing his people across the sea' and that his actions reflected 'an eye for an eye.'"

"His people"? And who exactly would that be? Taheri-azar is admirably upfront about his actions. As he told police, he wanted to "avenge the deaths or murders of Muslims around the world."

And yet the M-word appears nowhere in the Times report. Whether intentionally or not, they seem to be channeling the great Sufi theologian and jurist al-Ghazali, who died a millennium ago but whose first rule on the conduct of dhimmis -- non-Muslims in Muslim society -- seem to have been taken on board by the Western media:

The dhimmi is obliged not to mention Allah or His Apostle. . . .

Are they teaching that at Columbia Journalism School yet?

A fellow called Mohammed mows down a bunch of students? Just one of those things -- like a gran'ma in my neck of the woods a couple of years back who hit the wrong pedal in the parking lot and ploughed through a McDonald's, leaving the place a hideous tangle of crumbled drywall, splattered patties and incendiary hot apple-pie filling. Yet, according to his own statements, Taheri-azar committed an act of ideological domestic terrorism, which he'd planned for two months. He told police he was more disappointed more students in his path weren't struck and that he'd rented the biggest vehicle the agency had in order to do as much damage to as many people as possible. The Persian car pet may have been flooring it, but the media are idling in neutral, if not actively reversing away from the story as fast as they can. Taheri-azar informed the judge he was "thankful for the opportunity to spread the will of Allah," and it was apparently the will of Allah that he get behind the wheel of Allah.

Meanwhile, a new Washington Post/ABC poll finds that, in the words of the Post, "nearly half of Americans -- 46 percent -- have a negative view of Islam, seven percentage points higher than in the tense months after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, when Muslims were often targeted for violence."

"Often" targeted? Want to put some hard numbers on that? Like to compare the "violence" Americans perpetrated on Muslims after the slaughter of thousands of their fellow citizens in the name of Allah with, say, the death toll perpetrated by Muslims annoyed over some itsy-bitsy cartoons in an obscure Danish newspaper? In September 2001, 99.99999 percent of Americans behaved with remarkable forbearance. If they're less inclined to give the benefit of the doubt these days, perhaps it's because of casual slurs like the Post's or the no-jihad-to-see-here-folks tone of the Times.

Ronald Stockton of the University of Michigan doesn't see it that way: "You're getting a constant drumbeat of negative information about Islam," he told the Post. By "negative information," Professor Stockton presumably means the London bombings, and the Bali bombings, and the Madrid bombings and the Istanbul bombings. But surely it's worth asking why in 2006 the Washington Post needs a man with a name like "Ronald Stockton" to explain Islam to us? The diversity bores in the media go out of their way to hire writers of color, writers of gender, writers of orientation. Yet, five years after 9/11, where's the New York Times' Muslim columnist? Where's the ''Today Show's'' Islamic weather girl? Why, indeed, are all the Muslim voices in the press broadly on the right -- Amir Taheri in the New York Post, Stephen Schwartz in the Weekly Standard, Fouad Ajami in the Wall Street Journal?

If Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar is not a free-lance terrorist, then what is he? Who is he? What's he thinking? In the absence of any explanatory voices from the Muslim community, all we have are the bare bones of his resume: He's a 22-year old UNC psychology major who graduated in December. And what's revealing is the link between Taheri-azar's grievance and his action.
Take him at his word: He's upset about "the treatment of Muslims around the world" -- presumably at the hands of Israelis on the West Bank, of the Russians in Chechnya, the Indians in Kashmir, the Americans in the Sunni Triangle and the Danes in the funny pages. So what does he do to avenge Islam? He goes to the rental agency, takes out the biggest car on the lot, drives it to UNC and rams it into the men and women he's spent the last few years studying with and socializing with -- the one group of infidels he knows really well.

How many Muslims feel similarly? Not many in America, perhaps -- if only when compared to Europe: For all the multiculti blather, the United States still does a better job assimilating immigrants than France or Germany. A recent poll found that 40 percent of British Muslims want sharia introduced in the United Kingdom and 20 percent sympathized with the "feelings and motives" of the July 7 London Tube bombers. Or, more accurately, 20 percent were prepared to admit to a pollster they felt sympathy, which suggests the real figure might be somewhat higher. Huge numbers of Muslims -- many of them British subjects born and bred -- see their fellow Britons blown apart on trains and buses and are willing to rationalize the actions of mass murderers.

"East is east and west is west/And ne'er the twain shall meet," wrote Kipling. Obviously, they meet every moment of the day -- the cabbie driving you to your appointment in Washington, the affable fellow at the corner store. But proximity isn't the same as understanding: Taheri-azar and that 20 percent of British Muslims think they know "the west" and they don't like it. By contrast, the New York Times and Co. insist they like "the east" but go to an awful lot of trouble to avoid finding out anything that would ruffle their illusions. The twain would never meet, said Kipling, "till Earth and Sky meet presently/At God's great judgment seat."

I'd rather find out before then. Five years after Sept. 11, it's astonishing how little we still know about the West's Muslim populations.

David Warren on Islam and the post-Christian West

Very interesting article by David Warren, here, in the Ottawa Citizen, on the nature of the confrontation between the West and Islam, and Bush's role in it. Thanks RCP.

***
March 12, 2006
Ottawa Citizen

Revisitation

By David Warren

The Americans went into Afghanistan and Iraq with my blessings, as my reader may recall. I thought both decisions to invade were right, before either had been taken. But I thought this for reasons I never fully explained, that were never quite George Bush’s reasons -- more those of Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938). I was, for instance, sceptical about the project of bringing Western-style, bourgeois democracy -- and everything needed to support that -- to countries where politics by violence had so long prevailed. But if anyone could do it, I thought the Americans could, with their own history of heroic optimism, prevailing against insuperable odds.

A new book just landed in my mailbox, Redefining Sovereignty, ed. Orrin C. Judd. It contains an essay by me from four years ago, in which I tried to explain President Bush’s Lincolnesque thinking on world order. I think the essay has borne up fairly well, to this short passage of years. I said that Mr Bush was trying to vindicate and uphold the existing national state-system in the world, in exactly the way Lincoln went about upholding the American union. And that, Mr Bush’s commitment to spreading democracy was like Lincoln’s commitment to extinguishing slavery -- not the key point, but necessary to the key point of recovering order. If Lincoln could have preserved the union, and it meant keeping slavery, he would have done that.

Ditto, if Mr Bush thought he could restore the status quo ante of a Middle East that was no threat to the West, without pushing democracy down anyone’s throat, he would do that. But as he examined the problem presented to him by the Arab raids on New York and Washington, the morning of Sept. 11th, 2001, he saw that something more would be required. He believes, still, that there can be no lasting peace in the world until the “root cause” of this terrorist violence is removed. Hence, the evangelizing for democracy. Hence, the willingness to kick-start, by taking out two of the most abhorrent regimes known to man, and trying to repeat in Afghanistan and Iraq what the Americans accomplished in Germany, Italy, and Japan after World War II.

In this view -- which I hold to be Mr Bush’s -- we are dealing with what amounts to a planetary civil war, between those who accept the state-system descended from the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), and an emergent Islamist ideology that certainly does not. To Mr Bush’s mind, only legitimately-elected governments, presiding over properly-administered secular bureaucracies, can be trusted to deal locally with the kind of mischief an Osama bin Laden can perform, with his hands on contemporary weapons of mass destruction.

But Mr Bush was staking his bet on the assumption that the Islamists were not speaking for Islam; that the world’s Muslims long for modernity; that they are themselves repelled by the violence of the terrorists; that, most significantly, Islam is in its nature a religion that can be “internalized”, like the world’s other great religions, and that the traditional Islamic aspiration to conjoin worldly political with otherworldly spiritual authority had somehow gone away. It didn’t help that Mr Bush took for his advisers on the nature of Islam, the paid operatives of Washington’s Council on American-Islamic Relations, the happyface pseudo-scholar Karen Armstrong, or the profoundly learned but terminally vain Bernard Lewis. Each, in a different way, assured him that Islam and modernity were potentially compatible.

The question, “But what if they are not?” was never seriously raised, because it could not be raised behind the mud curtain of political correctness that has descended over the Western academy and intelligentsia. The idea that others see the world in a way that is not only incompatible with, but utterly opposed to, the way we see it, is the thorn ever-present in the rose bushes of multiculturalism. “Ideas have consequences”, and the idea that Islam imagines itself in a fundamental, physical conflict with everything outside of itself, is an idea with which people in the contemporary West are morally and intellectually incapable of coming to terms. Hence our continuing surprise at everything from bar-bombings in Bali, to riots in France, to the Danish cartoon apoplexy.

My own views on the issue have been aloof. More precisely, they have been infected with cowardice. I am so “post-modern” myself that I, too, find it almost impossible to think through the corollaries from our world’s hardest fact. And that fact is: the post-Christian West is out of its depth with Islam.

Monday, March 06, 2006

My AEI talk on institutionalizing the war on terror through legislation

Okay, I am going to toot my own horn ... Last week saw an exciting conference at the American Enterprise Institute, The Outsourcing of American Law. The web page has all the stuff on the conference, including transcripts and video, and the whole program. It featured stellar panels - Jack Goldsmith, John Yoo, Julian Ku, William Dodge, Morton Halperin, Beth Stephens, a long list of great folks, and a keynote address by Justice Scalia (annoyingly heckled by what I'm told were a group of Larouchians).

My particular plea was for the Bush administration to get behind efforts to institutionalize the war on terror through legislation - otherwise it will blow away with the wind the moment that a new administration, Republican or Democrat, enters the White House.

This is the topic of a day long conference that Tod Lindberg and I are putting on as a combination of the Hoover Institution and my law school, Washington College of Law at American University - it will be Monday, April 10, and everyone is encouraged to attend (more on logistics later).

Meanwhile, you can see the video of my talk and everyone else's at the conference by clicking on the video button here. And below is a transcript, including all my clumsy sentence constructions and failure to include verbs:

***
Kenneth Anderson: I would very much like to thank John for this privilege of being on this panel and also being in front of this very distinguished audience. So, I am absolutely delighted to be here. I will be addressing less the questions of international law than, in fact, making a sort of broad ranging plea about where I think that the institutionalization of the war on terror needs to go. I will be ranging broadly and not hitting anything really in any great detail.

But my thought is really very straight forward. It is that I don’t think that there will be an institutional war on terror, I don’t think that there will be much of a policy on a war on terror which outlasts this administration, which will be in place no matter whether there’s a Democrat in the White House or a Republican in the White House past this administration, unless this administration is willing to take on the burden of institutionalizing the war on terror and by going to Congress to do it.

I say that as somebody who is a very strong supporter of this administration and what it’s done to this point. But I don’t think there will be a war on terror in a meaningful policy sense unless the Administration is willing to take this issue to Congress and to find ways to enact some sort of comprehensive legislation that deals with the aspects of a war on terror.

Now, if we look briefly at the leading components on the war on terror, at least those that raise significant legal questions and the ones that have sort of bedeviled us, I think we can see where it is that a comprehensive legislative solution is most needed.

There are many, many open questions in the international law of armed conflict and its application to the war on terror. Without any question, there are many open questions about that. And yet, for all that, I don’t think that our fundamental issues about the legal regulation on the war on terror fundamentally arise from the law of armed conflict. I think it actually comes from other places.

Likewise, if we turn over to the pure questions of criminal law enforcement where police go and act in their purely police capacities and defendants are put into a criminal law justice system, yes, there are open questions about secrecy, about many different aspects of when is somebody appropriately a defendant, when do they enter the criminal justice system. But by and large, once they’re in, to a fair extent those questions are relatively settled within our settled criminal justice system.

Where the issue of regulation arises principally, I think, is in a certain area between those two. By between those two I mean what, for lack of a better term, and I really don’t think it’s a particularly good term, what we might call an intelligence war, an intelligence struggle where the fundamental issues wind up being the collection of intelligence. All sorts of legal issues that rise out of surveillance, that arise out of detention, that arise out of rendition, that arise out of interrogation, that arise out of what constitutes impermissible interrogation and torture. All of those kinds of legal issues arise fundamentally in an area which is neither law enforcement, nor in most cases, many cases at least, is it something which is genuinely part of an actual armed conflict in a legal sense at that moment, in the sense that Afghanistan is an armed conflict, in the sense that the war in Iraq is an armed conflict in a legal sense. In those kinds of areas, and we can add one more to that, which is the use of force which is neither clearly police work, nor does it clearly rise to the level of armed conflict. So, you might call it the use of force short of armed conflict.

Those are the areas in which we largely lack legal regulation in which we do not have some sort of set out paradigm for dealing with it, in which we are grabbing pieces from the criminal law system, grabbing pieces from the law of armed conflict. I think that it’s time that we recognize that this area is going to require some new legal concepts and the elucidation of new areas that we’ve not gone into before. Part of which can be drawn from existing areas, but others of which I think will be genuinely new.

Now, the answer of the Bush Administration to date has been we have inherent executive authority, and skip all the legal arguments, but in effect, we have inherent legal authority from one source or another by which as an executive simply do all this stuff. We’ll do it in sort of a try this, try that fashion. If there’s too much public pressure in one area, then we will move to another approach. But basically we do not need to go to Congress in order to get this kind of authority. One way or another, we’ve already got it.

Now, I have read very carefully John’s book and many of John’s writings and am actually a closet disciple, John.

John Yoo: You’re going to regret that when you come up for confirmation hearings for the Supreme Court.

Kenneth Anderson: Right, right. Now, here’s the problem, however. I am a disciple of John’s in the pure ethereal, theoretical, scholarly, magnificently cerebral atmosphere of my attic. When I look at the actual war on terror, however, and when I look at what the Bush Administration has done its best to convince me of over the course of the years since 9-11, what has it said to me? It has said this is going to be a long war. This is going to be a long struggle. This is going to go on beyond any particular presidential administration. Look to the long term on this. Well, I am entirely persuaded of that. Under those circumstances I think it is also entirely unacceptable to say we the executive have simply got inherent authority to wind up doing whatever it is we think is the right approach to that in it or any particular circumstances.

The ability to respond to a national emergency is one thing. The ability to go on for decades in the form of the Cold War is another entirely. What we need now is a legislative pronouncement, is a legislative enactment, developed with the Administration that winds up institutionalizing this in some fashion. Institutionalizing it in the way in which we instituted and institutionalized the effort against the Soviet Union and the Cold War, one which marginalizes the Wallace Democrats and one in which also it embraces as broad a bipartisanship as possible. And I stress as possible. But one which is fundamentally something which can outlast any particular administration. We have not done that to date and it is, in my view, the single most important foreign policy obligation of this administration besides the prosecution of actual or possible wars.
Now, I can’t tell you what the details of that is supposed to look like. I can tell you a couple of things. First of all, there are areas besides the war on terror of enormous practical importance that go beyond the three that I had mentioned. Criminal justice on the one hand, armed conflict on the other and the sort of undefined intelligence thing in the middle. There is, for example, financial regulation to try and cut off the sources of financing. There’s diplomacy in the effort, for example, come up with a comprehensive definition of terrorism. There are all sorts of different aspects. The most important, however, is this undefined area that I’ve characterized as the intelligence struggle.

The areas that we need to develop standards would be at least these. One would be surveillance. Judge Posner has written a very useful, I think, very quick guide in the Wall Street Journal to what legislation should look like in order to deal with questions of FISA, the NSA, wire tapping, these kinds of things.

Second is that it’s going to have to wind up having a policy with regards to detention and rendition. What the standards are going to be for those things and how they interrelate with the existing laws of war to the extent that they have to develop new standards. And to the extent that one has got to find the lines between what constitutes legal armed conflict and not. And how on the other side, it interacts with the domestic criminal justice system.

Third, it’s going to wind up having to address the questions of interrogation and what crosses the line of permissible interrogation into torture. So the question of what’s the users manual going to be for the convention against torture. What actually crosses the line. I don’t think that there’s any alternative but for some kind of legislative enactment and I don’t think the McCain amendment did it. It’s a good start in order to at least start a conversation, but it did not answer the questions.

In that particular area of interrogation, I think that the most important question will wind up being do we believe that the standards of interrogation should wind up taking into account what it is that we know about the person whom we have in custody. Should it be the case that the harshness of interrogation, short of torture, is permissibly greater in the case of somebody who we know to a hundred percent in certainty is our enemy. Or, should it be something different in the case of somebody for whom we have no reason to know that this isn’t just the shepherd out there wandering around the hillside. We have to answer that question about whether it makes a difference what you know about the person you’re interrogating or not.

Then finally we have to, at least on this list, answer the questions about what are the standards for the use of force in circumstances that do not, in fact, rise to the legal standard of armed conflict. In most of those cases I believe in that latter case, I think that in many of those cases, that that actually is fairly easy that we should apply the standards that we would apply in armed conflict as a legal matter in any case. But none the less, I think that’s also something that needs to be legislatively enacted.

Now, let me close simply by saying once again that I do not believe that the next administration, Democrat or Republican, will hold itself to anything other than a sort of surface rhetoric about a war on terrorism unless it has somehow been institutionalized in a way by Congress. I think it will be seen as an artifact of this administration. Charitably, it will be seen as an artifact of the post-9-11 years, but I do not think there will be a war on terror as such unless this administration is willing to take it to the Congress and somehow get it passed as legislation. Thank you.

The range of idealist positions in international law, and a footnote on how HRW may foreshadow shifts in liberal internationalisma and human rights

Traditionally, when people have talked about idealism in international law, they mean liberal internationalism or, if you prefer, global constitutionalism or global federalism. But in fact we could conceptualize a range of idealist positions in international law - a continuum based around the question of the role of sovereignty in international law. What would the range of positions look like?[1]

1. Sovereignty as its own value, sovereignty for its own sake. The most extreme position toward the sovereignty end of the range is the assertion of sovereignty as its own value. It might seem, especially to some realists and some liberal internationalists, peculiar to claim that sovereignty is actually a value, an ideal position, rather than simply the assertion of power. It can be understood as an actual value, however, by understanding it as the underpinning for any autonomous political community – understood as an ideal, it ascribes a certain value simply to the fact that a political community orders itself without outside interference. In this sense, it is an assertion of value for a democratic sovereign such as the United States, but with respect to the narrow value of sovereignty, just as much an assertion of value for the autocratic, repressive, theocratic, brutal monarchy that is Saudi Arabia. It is, in other words, sovereignty understood as the value of self-determination, even for societies that are cruel, unjust, and autocratic – we do acknowledge that, within some limit gradually evolving as to genocide and massive internal human rights abuses, even wicked societies have a right to self-determination.[2] How much to ascribe to the value of bare sovereignty, sovereignty which is grounded in no virtue or value other than the bare claim of self-determination? Only as much one would ascribe to Saudi Arabia, Zimbabwe, Sudan, and the rest of the world’s worst dictators. It is worth noting that China’s foreign policy and view of international law, to the extent that it has any root at all in ideals and is not simply relentlessly self-interest, is fundamentally simply the assertion of the right and value of sovereignty, for its own sake.

2. Democratic sovereignty. The resurgence of sovereignty as a position among some academics in international law, as well as in the rhetoric of the Bush administration, is not really about the assertion of bare self-determination, sovereignty for its own sake. On the contrary, the ‘new sovereignty’ positions put forward by such writers as Jeremy Rabkin, Julian Ku, Jack Goldsmith, John Yoo, Curtis Bradley, and Jed Rubenfeld, among others – the resurgence of a position that liberal internationalists thought was buried permanently as an assertion of idealism, rather than merely a realist reminder of the inconvenient facts of power – are all fundamentally dependent upon the assertion of some value other than sovereignty. That value is, without exception, democracy, the popular sovereignty of a self-governing people. Sovereignty is essentially the vessel of power that protects within it another value, that of democracy. Self-determination is, on this account, a residual category, essentially subsumed within the value of democracy itself. It is for precisely this reason, of course, that this view of sovereignty is available to the world’s constitutional democratic sovereigns in a way that it is not to the world’s autonomous dictatorships, who at most can reach to the ‘bare’ value of sovereignty. But the fact of democratic self-rule, if it is robust, is that fidelity to ‘internal’ democratic mechanisms makes it difficult to accommodate to ‘external’ mechanisms of global governance, such as those urged by liberal internationalism and global constitutionalism. At bottom, the condition stated by Abraham Lincoln for constitutional sovereign democracy, a “political community, without a political superior,” will in practice, if not absolutely in theory, bar absorption into a larger global federal society. That is even more true if the theory upon which global governance asserts its legitimacy is not popular sovereignty from the bottom-up, the actual votes of people from the bottom up, but instead universal values (as liberal internationalism does with universal human rights) from the top down.

3. Sovereign state multilateralism. Just because states (re)assert the conditions of democratic sovereignty does not deprive them of the ability to work together closely, in active and deep ways. The choice in order to have an international political order is not liberal internationalism or nothing. On the contrary, one needs to go beyond the robust multilateralism available to freely cooperating sovereigns and, particularly, democratic sovereigns only if the aim is to go beyond a merely “international political” order of sovereign states to a genuinely global or transnational society – to transcend the merely political and international in favor of a social and transnational order. If the covert agenda is not this transformation of the international from a political order to a “society,” then strong multilateralism is what a functioning international order would look like as an ideal of sovereign cooperation.

4. Multilateral pooled sovereignty, looking toward global federalism. Multilateralism can be remade as an ideal by introducing to it an aspirational condition – multilateralism today, but looking forward to a future day when multilateralism is replaced by genuinely global institutions that transcend mere states. That aspirational condition is expressed in the present not merely by pious invocations of liberal internationalism, but instead by attempts to ‘pool’ sovereignty in ways that, in practical terms if not absolute legal ones, make backing out difficult for a sovereign state.

5. Global governance through NGOs partnered with public international organizations. As NGOs asserted themselves throughout the 1990s with respect to both sovereign states and international organizations, a new ideal of global governance arose which idealized governance by a partnership of international organizations that would receive legitimacy for their expanded rule from international NGOs – recharacterized for the purpose of legitimation as “global civil society.” The function of NGOs in this ideal is thought to be to supplying the missing democratic predicate that the international political order so conspicuously lacks. Global civil society would “represent” the peoples of the world to international organizations – the UN in particular – and thus provide a ground of legitimacy that aims to bypass sovereign states as the (limiting) source of international organization legitimacy, on the one hand, and overcome the charge of a ‘democracy deficit’, on the other. These theories of global governance and legitimacy are still with us today, but they probably reached their apogee with the Millennium summit of 2000, when Kofi Annan essentially blessed global civil society as a stand-in for the peoples of the world. Since that moment, however, a host of critics have – quite successfully – challenged the bona fides of international NGOs to call themselves representatives of anything other than themselves or to overcome the democracy deficit of international institutions. It continues, however, to be a powerful element defining the dynamic of interaction between the UN and international NGOs – each grants the other the legitimacy it lacks. Moreover, it is a crucial element in the attempt by liberal internationalism to convert an international political order into a global social order, in order to attain the legitimacy that comes with being a society and not merely a politics.[3] The ideal no longer strives quite so hard to suggest that NGOs should actually have a role in governance – while still asserting quite strongly that NGOs play a crucial role in the legitimation of presumed global governance institutions such as the UN. Since it is legitimacy that transforms power into authority and presses forward an upward spiral of power reinforcing authority reinforcing legitimacy, the terms of this essentially ideological debate are highly important and, hence, highly contested.

6. Global governance by global government networks. The difficulties for legitimizing global governance because of the difficulties of the democratic legitimacy of the combination of NGOs and international organizations have not gone unnoticed. Accordingly, within the past few years, another proposal for global governance has emerged, championed by Anne-Marie Slaughter in her quite remarkable book, A New World Order.[4] Her alternative proposal acknowledges from the outset that the problem of democratic legitimacy for NGOs and international organizations is real and cannot be overcome by forms of words that simply attempt to redefine the meaning of democracy to make it conveniently fit a liberal internationalist model.[5] In place of international organizations or NGOs or both, Slaughter proposes networks of national government actors – bureaucrats and judges, principally, using their national authority in networks towards common goals. What makes this more than simply robust multilateralism is her vision that over time, these actors become socialized toward a “horizontal” global orientation, alongside their homologues in other places around the world, along with their “vertical” loyalties within their own societies. It attempts to solve the democratic deficit by using actors who indeed have democratic legitimacy within actual nation states, while still finding a global basis for action by actors who see themselves as having obligations both nationally and globally. My own view is that this careful balancing act must eventually collapse into liberal internationalism – that is, into a set of loyalties that are finally international and global rather than national – but the attempt to solve the dilemma straight on, without definitional fiat, and without denying both that democracy cannot exist on a planetary level and that global government as such would be, for that reason alone, undesirable, is the most intelligent move forward in the global governance debate in at least a decade.

7. Liberal internationalism. Liberal internationalism is characterized by the unapologetic, naked claim that the point is finally not multilateralism exercised however robustly by sovereign states, but the irrevocable ceding of that sovereignty to a higher authority than the nation state or any political community other than the planet as a whole. This condition, as I note further on, requires a further condition, viz., the acceptance of a cosmopolitanism on the part of at least the governing elites of this global order – one that requires that they put their allegiance first to a global order over any merely national or local order and, in keeping with the move from a politics to a society, that they think of themselves as social actors within a global society, which is to say, as cosmopolitans who share a society, values, allegiances, and social relations with others of that global society. These are, of course, very strong conditions, and liberal internationalism acknowledges it as an aspirational ideal. But the fact that it is the central aspiration sets the terms for what multilateralism is supposed to be and supposed to accomplish. It is not, on this conception, enough for multilateralism to succeed at whatever its narrow task might be; it must also and, in some sense, more importantly serve to chip away at the conditions of sovereignty that underlie pure multilateralism. And finally, liberal internationalism is characterized by (and goes beyond aspirational multilateralism because it asserts) a system of values – universal human rights – which, in its view, actually trump even claims of democracy and the natural expression of democracy within a constituted national political community, popular sovereignty. Liberal internationalism looks to the ideology of human rights as a means of overcoming the claims of democracy and popular sovereignty of self-governing political community – it asserts that the universal – understood, in a certain sleight of hand, to be identical with international – values of human rights take precedence even over local democracy. Since ‘universal’ is assumed to be identical with ‘international’, international values must inevitably be accepted over local ones. Liberal internationalists are quite correct in seeing it as global constitutionalism and global federalism. Liberal internationalism is ‘liberal’ insofar as its human rights universals have a ‘liberal’ content (although increasingly, in the emerging conflicts with Islam-as-ideology, human rights are taking on not a liberal content, but a multicultural one that, in effect, blames ‘dominant’ Western culture for any lapses in respect for human rights by Muslims).[6]

8. Parliamentary world government. Parliamentary world government is frequently ridiculed as an ideal in global governance, not only by sovereigntists hostile to the whole idea of global governance, but frequently by liberal internationalists eager to show that there is something still further “out there” that is not liberal internationalism and presumably makes it seem less radical. The ridicule is misplaced, however, for a very important reason. The call for parliamentary world democracy – a new chamber in the UN, for example, is sometimes suggested, one that might consist of parliamentarians elected from countries in the manner of the European Parliament – has the profound virtue of acknowledging, without evasion or cant, that democracy matters. It acknowledges that no form of global governance can legitimately exist, at least with strong authority, without democratic structures in their ordinary sense – raising hands and voting. It attempts no definitional end-runs around the meaning of democracy and for that it should be admired and respected. You may believe, as I do, that parliamentary democracy cannot exist meaningfully at the level of the whole planet – democracy does not “scale up” forever, and what we call the world’s largest democracies, such as the United States or India, are only partially democratic precisely because of their size. But the forthrightness of the parliamentary world government ideal must be celebrated, not scorned.

***
It bears noting that this continuum is one of idealisms. It is not about a continuum from idealism to realism. Instead, it aims to show that the old realist-idealist divide is less important today than the debates among those who are all idealists. Once upon a time, idealism simply meant liberal internationalism, tempered by the brute facts of realism, of real power. Today, the debates are among different views of idealism.

(This is drawn from a section of a review of Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner's The Limits of International Law, appearing shortly in the University of Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law. I will post it to SSRN once it is done. Take a look at footnote 6, below, on the question of whether "liberal internationalism" will remain liberal, or instead morph into something more like "multicultural internationalism." That's where I discuss Human Rights Watch and its slide from liberal human rights into multiculturalism. I will expand that footnote into a longer article or else wrap it into the book I am completing on global governance and NGOs and the UN.)

[1] I am drawing much of this discussion in an abbreviated fashion from Kenneth Anderson, “Squaring the Circle,” 118 Harvard Law Review 1255, at 1260-1266 (February 2005).

[2] This is essentially Walzer’s argument in Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. The account of self-determination was possibly overly influenced by the experience of the Vietnam War; Walzer’s more recent writings, in Dissent and elsewhere, suggest that he has come to accept more external restrictions on “bare” sovereignty than he did in the 1970s.

[3] The point here is essentially a Weberian one. In Weber’s conception, institutions can have legitimacy, but institutional legitimacy is less a matter of politics than being institutions of a larger and broader legitimate social order - sharing as institutions in the legitimacy that really matters for Weber, the legitimacy that attaches to a larger legitimate social order. The task for liberal internationalism or global constitutionalism, however one styles it, then, is not essentially political. It is, far more importantly, social – the transformation of what is now essentially a political order into a social order. That is, at bottom, what is meant when senior UN officials, for example, talk wistfully – as Mark Malloch Brown does on occasion – of modernizing the UN to make it less a creature of member states. At one level, the issue is member states and their demands. At a deeper level, the desire is to move beyond the political order implied by ‘states’ to a society that is populated by states, yes, but also by individual actors such as diplomats and international bureaucrats, and above all, by NGOs that can serve as a kind of proxy for the “peoples of the world” necessary to claim that the international order is not merely a politics but a society – to claim the legitimacy that, for Weber, obtains for a social order. For those seeking an easier point of entry into this literature than launching directly into Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds. (University of California 1978), 2 vols., and the famous discussion of the condition of a legitimate social order in volume 1, I recommend Wolfgang J. Mommsen, The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber (University of Chicago 1989), chapter 3, “Max Weber’s Theory of Legitimacy Today,” at 44.

[4] Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton UP 1994); see my review at Kenneth Anderson, “Squaring the Circle,” 118 Harvard Law Review 1255 (February 2005); see also Peter Berkowitz, “Laws of Nations,” Policy Review, April-May 2005, reviewing the Slaughter book along with The Limits of International Law and Jeremy Rabkin, Law Without Nations? Why Constitutional Government Requires Sovereign States (Princeton UP 2005).

[5] The theorist most prone to “solving” the democracy problem by mere definitional fiat is surely David Held. See, among many similar works, David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford UP 1995).

[6] See, e.g., the remarkable briefing statement by Human Rights Watch regarding the publication of the Mohammed cartoons in Denmark. For an organization devoted presumably to human rights with a ‘liberal’ content, it has shown itself strikingly less and less comfortable with the most ‘liberal’ value of all – at least Voltaire would have thought so – free expression. The storm over the cartoons broke open in violence and rioting in January 2006; Human Rights Watch, so impressively quick to comment on nearly everything else, did not manage to express any view at all for weeks, finally posting a briefing statement in the form of questions and answers on February 15, 2006. One wonders, frankly, what internal debates went on that required weeks for an organization ordinarily so swift to put statements in the hands of the press finally to issue a statement on a matter that a liberal, as distinguished from a multiculturalist, would have thought quite easy. See “Questions and Answers on the Danish Cartoons and Freedom of Expression: When Speech Offends,” at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/02/15/denmar12676.htm. The background statement manages – with significant multiculturalist hedging – finally to reach a conclusion that the publication of the cartoons could not be banned.

In reaching that final conclusion, however, HRW begins by essentially casting blame, in an exercise of multiculturalist responsibility-shifting, off of rioting and violent mobs and onto discriminatory European states: “The cartoon controversy should be understood,” says HRW, “against a backdrop of rising Western prejudice and suspicion directed against Muslims, and an associated sense of persecution among Muslims in many parts of the world. In Europe, rapidly growing Muslim communities have become the continent’s largest religious minority but also among its most economically disadvantaged communities and the target of discriminatory and anti-immigration measures.”

Is that really how it should be understood – against a backdrop of rising Western prejudice and suspicion of Muslims? Is that really how a liberal, not a multiculturalist, would understand it? Surely a real liberal would write, instead, as Christopher Hitchens does:

“The incredible thing about the ongoing Kristallnacht against Denmark (and in some places, against the embassies and citizens of any Scandinavian or even European Union nation) is that it has resulted in, not opprobrium for the religion that perpetrates and excuses it, but increased respectability! A small democratic country with an open society, a system of confessional pluralism, and a free press has been subjected to a fantastic, incredible, organized campaign of lies and hatred and violence, extending to one of the gravest imaginable breaches of international law and civility: the violation of diplomatic immunity. And nobody in authority can be found to state the obvious and the necessary—that we stand with the Danes against this defamation and blackmail and sabotage. Instead, all compassion and concern is apparently to be expended upon those who lit the powder trail, and who yell and scream for joy as the embassies of democracies are put to the torch in the capital cities of miserable, fly-blown dictatorships. Let's be sure we haven't hurt the vandals' feelings. You wish to say that it was instead a small newspaper in Copenhagen that lit the trail? What abject masochism and nonsense. It was the arrogant Danish mullahs who patiently hawked those cartoons around the world (yes, don't worry, they are allowed to exhibit them as much as they like) until they finally provoked a vicious response against the economy and society of their host country.” Christopher Hitchens, “Stand Up for Denmark: Why Are We Not Defending Our Ally?” Slate, February 21, 2006, at http://www.slate.com/id/2136714/.

At some point, the break between a certain form of liberalism, as found in supposedly universal human rights values, and a form of liberalism rewritten by multiculturalism, seems inevitable. At that point, too, however, the evidence provided by HRW suggests that the “international community” is likely to incline toward multicultural, rather than liberal, content for the supposedly universal values of human rights, as these international elites attempt to ride the tiger of managing civilizational discord through assertions of universality whose terms they purport to control. But one of the many disasters of multiculturalism is that, as an essentially managerial discourse from above, it seeks to placate various threatening constituencies by excusing their extra-legitimate exercises of power, often through violence or threats of violence – but then it turns out not to be able to ‘manage’ them anyway, losing both the struggle over universals and substantive liberal values all at the same time.

If this be thought far afield from the definition of liberal internationalism, it is not. On the contrary, it points out what might, over time, turn out to be one of defining characteristics of liberal internationalism – that it turns out not to be ‘liberal’ internationalism but, instead, ‘multicultural’ internationalism. It might turn out that the values that underpin liberal internationalism – the content of its assertedly trumping human rights discourse – turn out not to be liberal in content after all, but gradually shift away from liberal values, Enlightenment values, to something quite different. All the more reason, therefore, to be skeptical of international human rights, as determined by international bodies and the managerial, top down culture of the “international community,” as being identical with “universal” values. Global constitutionalism, that is, might turn out to be not about a liberal constitution at all.

The consequence of all this? Well, it might turn out that the most vehement supporters of democratic sovereignty in the future turn out to be not Americans, but Western Europeans seeking to defend a liberal secular order not merely from religious attack by religionists who have no use for modernity except as a vehicle to technology, but additionally from religious attack buttressed by a form of international human rights that has moved from liberalism to multiculturalism. It might well be those Europeans, not Americans, most eager to find an ideological ground on which to defend the social space of a substantive liberalism.

In memory of Ed Cummings

Like Chris Borgen at Opinio Juris and many, many others in the world of public international law, here and abroad, I was saddened to learn that Ed Cummings had finally succumbed to the cancer he had been fighting. He was a superb lawyer, careful, thoughtful, and intelligent. He will be greatly missed. I reproduce below Chris's post:

***
In Memory of Edward R. Cummings
by Chris Borgen

David Kaye, a State Department lawyer who is on leave as director of the Center for International and Comparative Law at Whittier Law School, wrote to tell me that Edward R. Cummings, a long-time lawyer at the State Department’s Office of the Legal Adviser has passed away. Ed was not the type of guy who is often mentioned on blogs. He wasn’t an academic celebrity. He wasn’t a bomb-thrower. He was a quite simply a great lawyer. George Washington University Law School, his alma mater, has posted an obit and links to the remarks of Rep. Tom Lantos and to a symposium that was held in his honor.

Following are some thoughts written by David Kaye:

Much of the blogging and academic community may be unfamiliar with the name Ed Cummings. But within the U.S. government – and throughout foreign and defense ministry legal offices around the world – Ed’s name has been well-known since he first joined the American delegation to the Geneva negotiating sessions that led to the adoption of the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.Early in his career, he wrote major academic pieces on the rights and obligations of occupying powers and the treatment – and criminal punishment, where warranted – of prisoners of war, giving him early and well-deserved notice (particularly among Israeli lawyers coping with the still-new occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and Sinai). After serving as a JAG officer in the Army’s international law section in the 1970s, Ed joined the Office of the Legal Adviser (“L”) at the State Department in 1979. He worked on African affairs for some time but then returned to the political-military issues that were, for him, the most rewarding.Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, Ed led the office’s political-military section as an Assistant Legal Adviser. He became well-known throughout the government as one of the leading experts in all areas of the jus ad bellum, jus in bello (occupation, POWs, weapons, etc.), foreign assistance and foreign relations law more generally, intelligence law, and many other bread-and-butter issues for L lawyers. He was a uniquely capable negotiator, developing important relationships with individuals across agencies, governments and international organizations (especially the ICRC). From 1995 to 2000, he served as the legal adviser to the U.S. Mission in Geneva, further deepening his renown as a model U.S. government lawyer.

Ed’s role – particularly in the difficult years following 9/11 – will probably remain below the radar of most historical accounts of why decisions evolved as they did. A committed public servant who devoted his career to advancing the protections of civilians and the military in times of war, Ed’s views during the administration’s consideration of such matters as military commissions and the application of the Geneva Conventions were based on his commitment to international law, the well-being of American troops and the humane treatment principles at the heart of humanitarian law. But he was never shrill and he was always constructive. What do we do with detainees who are captured in the war on terror? Ed led internal discussions of this question long before it became the topic of active academic dialogue. For those in the trenches of the early debates – especially over military commissions and application of the Geneva Conventions –Ed’s ideas, expertise, creativity and engagement were an inspiration behind many of the positions taken by State and military lawyers.Throughout his career, Ed earned numerous awards, too numerous to mention. The Government of Canada even gave him an award previously reserved for Canadian nationals. But the one thing that the awards quite failed to capture was his commitment to those who worked for him and with him. This commitment was not altogether unique, but it was at another level. His pride in seeing his “subordinates” – Ed was never heard referring to a junior lawyer as anything other than “the expert on this subject” – succeed was limitless. He pushed his lawyers to be their best, to be involved closely with their clients, to provide legal advice that was not only sound but also useful, creative and moral. It seems that every single lawyer who worked for him over the years believed that he was the best boss they ever had.

Ed passed away last Monday at 57, leaving behind a legion of disciples and admirers, more friends than one could count, an attitude toward life (optimism begins with good spin), and a contribution to public service – in the form of treaties and laws that bear his fingerprints – that will long endure.

Sunday, March 05, 2006


Renee shooting in Bishop, California last August 2005. (I wasn't actually planning on posting this here, but I got mixed up and put it on this blog rather than the family one. Oh well. Guess I'll leave it.)